Q8A3-4:  After reading that I have to wonder where I am. 

Q8A1-2:  This reminds me of a crack by N.T. Wright that he is not a panentheist, but rather a theenpanist.  The use of the term esse is quite challenging in each of these questions.  What really is essence?  What really is existence for that matter?  As is the case when you are learning your first language (and to an extent with a second), the answer lies not in a dictionary definition, but rather in continuous usage.  I believe I have a better handle on those terms the further I go in this work and hope that the trend continues.

On a related note, it is interesting the degree to which St. Thomas anticipates the concept of space-time.  Of course, I would not be surprised if the Greeks did as well.  It seems like just about everything the modern world prizes itself on discovering were found long ago in a village hugging a mountain in the Peloponnese or in a tent beside the Jordan River.

Vale,

JR

Q7A3-4:  Some thoughts on infinity.  For some reason, this reminded me of math class.

Q7A1-2

I slacked off a bit while traveling in the Great White North, but back on the Thomistic horse.

My first reaction is that God is not infinite, because I think of all the things he is not: in a word, sin.  However, if sin is negation, I imagine the concept of God as infinite works.  Then we consider whether anything else can be infinite.  The answer is no and it seems intuitive enough, though I must say St. Thomas trip through this question was pleasingly logical in a linear way.

Vale,

JR

Q4

Playing catch up here, I started on Q4 last week but never got around to writing down my thoughts and finishing.  It seems Q3 got my brain all in a tangle thinking about the mathematical significance of prime numbers.  So instead of continuing my slog, I took a detour down the rabbit hole of analytic number theory which ended (for now) in reading Prime Obsession, which is a fantastic account of what many consider the most famous unsolved mathematics problem in existence today (still, after 150+ years).  Excellent read historically, as well as mathematically, for those who enjoy a good story and even moreso a good problem. Now, back to our regularly scheduled programming....

Q4A1: I like the concept of perfection being that which lacks nothing in actuality as related to potentiality.  Never thought of it quite like that, and it puts the burden of perfection in nature back squarely on understanding first what something is in its essence, which we rarely do.

Q4A2:  Pure Thomas here.  I cannot fathom any circumstance in which I would have thought to ask this question, nor spend as much as a few seconds consideration of it.  But here it is in all of its logical glory.

Q4A3: The Catholic brain here is nodding.  Of course the created can be "like" God, only insofar as it imitates God.  Fatherhood, Priesthood, Teaching, etc....the essence of which, for us, lies in how they imitate and partake of the one nature of those things in God.  Ergo, man's likeness in relation to God derives from how man is created to imitate God in holiness/sanctity?

Q6A3-4:  If I have this right, then God is the only being that is essentially good and all other beings derive their goodness from their participation in Him.  Anyone else have a different take?

Q6A1-2:  This seems to be setting up a foundation for later use.  God is not only the good, but the supreme good.  I wonder how this intersects with Plato's Form of Good? 

Q5A6:  Now that's more like it.  The good is composed of the useful, pleasurable and noble.  The noble is defined as the telos of desire.  Excellent.  This reminds me of what Chesterton has to say about the antipathy between Christianity and Buddhism.  The Faith is about the fulfillment of desire, not its extinction.

Q5A5:  Well that was not so inspiring.  The good has mode, species and order.  Nevertheless, it appears that St. Thomas assumes we have a great deal of knowledge about those three that apparently I do not.

Q5A4:  Though I always enjoy discussions on the different types of causes (fond memories of law school and exploding packages on trains), I especially liked the almost throw-away comment in the third response to the effect that a man is good because of his will, not his intellect.  I believe this is quite a departure from Socrates/Plato.  I have a vague memory that this is in line with Aristotle.  I wholeheartedly endorse, for what it's worth.

Q5A1-3:  According to St. Thomas, all being is good.  Therefore, one assumes (and A3 pretty well says) evil is a sort of non-being, or lack.  However, I have normally thought of evil as a distortion of the good.  I am comfortable with the pre-existence of the good, but isn't sin an addition to the good, and thereby an evil?  Doesn't the Philosopher say that vice is not only a deficiency, but also an excess of what otherwise would be a virtue?

JR

Q4A3:  I am reminded of the great Archangel, "Who is like God?"  That question seems more like a challenge.  Nevertheless, I particularly liked the statement that you can say a statue is like a man, but cannot (in the way St. Thomas is describing) say that a man is like a statue.  So too in references to God.  I wonder what our Eastern friends would say about this article and its relationship to theosis.

Q4A1-2:  It makes intuitive sense that God is perfect.  It is illuminative to remember that perfect actually means "complete."  As so often, my mind goes to grammar.  The perfect tense is an action that not only occurred in the past, but was completed.  St. Thomas obviously has an opinion in the "open theism" debate!  Nevertheless, this line of questioning, especially in A2 is difficult for me.  I have heard that the Western tradition has been relatively more Aristotelian whereas the East has tended more Platonic.  This line of questioning, and this speculation about God Himself seem rather Platonic to me.  A2 seems to be contemplating the existence of Platonic Ideals within God.  To be clear, it is not that I disagree, but it does not fire my imagination.  Perhaps it should, after all, what ought one more contemplate than the Deity?  However, I am reminded of various Eastern heresies (Nestorianism, monothelitism, etc) and cannot help but think that they spring from too much speculation in such areas.  Frankly, I am more excited to read what St. Thomas has to say about ethics, moral duties, and politics.  That is part of the reason I am doing this slog; I do not want to solely feed my natural inclinations of interest, but rather, for a time, to submit to the great Scholastic Master.  Speaking of submission, my lack of inclination to these speculations also leads to my attitude toward the heresies of late antiquity: "Council of Bishops made a decision?  Great, let's move on.  Look, we can build an aqueduct here."  I am an American, after all.

Gentlemen, a very well organized version of the STh can be found here, in which the articles, objections and replies are organized in outline form with topical hyperlinks.

I am with Peter with respect to the simplex. 

Insofar as the eighth article deals with God entering into composites, that seems to be fine with transubstantiation (because God is replacing another essence rather than combining with one); St. Thomas seems to disprove consubstantiation (among other things) here.  Of course, I think I remember reading at some point that Luther himself was also against consubstantiation and that most Lutherans bristle at the term.

Q3

Q3A6: This made me consider Christ's command towards evangelization & catechesis, "teaching them to observe all that I have commanded you" (Matt 28:20).  If God can have nothing that is not absolutely essential, what does that imply about His teaching to us?

Q3A7: Simplex helps here as modern usage of simple tends to the derogatory.  From a non-composite standpoint though, it had never occurred to me previously the immense importance of prime numbers in relation to nearly all areas of mathematics.  Even the complex is rooted in the simplex.

Q3A8: St. Thomas posits "it is not possible for God to enter into the composition of anything, either as a formal or a material principle".  It makes more sense to me if principium is translated here as source, as otherwise one might see that as contradicting e.g. the reality of the Eucharist (with the popular phrasing of "changing").

Q3A5:  Is God one of a genus?  Certainly not a question I would have thought to ask, but taken in His totality, I imagine it makes sense that He is not.  How will this apply during discussions on the Trinity?  Is a member of the Trinity a member of a genus?

On the subject of St. Tom...

H/T to Mr. Samwel for liking Taylor Marshall's new project: The New St. Thomas Institute (don't let the word 'new' scare you away...think old wine, new wine skin). I just matriculated.

Q3A1:  St. Thomas does a fine job of demonstrating that God is not a body.  How this will square with the incarnation (surely a later question), will be interesting to see.

Q3A2:  Ah matter and form, one cannot help but hear the echoes of Plato and the wailings of the Nominalists in this analysis and the distinction itself.  Beautiful - and persuasive.

Q3A3:  Is God the same as his essence?  This is some serious metaphysics here and I feel somewhat awed.  Honestly, I do not know what I could add or what comment I could make.

Q3A4:  The distinction between existence and essence is always interesting to me; the quote "Existence precedes essence" which I used to buy but no longer do, comes to mind.  The part about it being a necessary factor of man to laugh was especially pleasing.  I must say, it made me laugh.

Q2A2:  This goes against my residual existentialism (I fell for Kierkegaard in high school and one does not easily overcome such a thing) and general inclination to believe.  If one does not believe in God, can such a fact really be demonstrated?  How does the will of man play in here?  Remember what Abraham said to the rich man across the chasm.

Q2A3:  This is probably the most popularly known passage written by Aquinas - the five proofs.  They are good as far as they go; I find four rather unpersuasive, but the others have a certain impact.  What really impresses me is the objections and the responses thereto.  There is nothing new under the sun.  One would think Aquinas encountered the "new" atheists.

Q2A1:  This one surprised me.  I have always found the existence of God self-evident (so much so that I find the Jewish convention of not writing the divine name to be quite compelling).  This provides difficulties in that I cannot engage agnostics (let alone soi-disant atheists) very well as their perspective is so foreign to me.  My childhood was by no means religious,  we did not start going to church until I was in 5th or 6th grade and I started going before my father did, but I just always knew that God was there.  I hasten to add though, that none of this is bragging; I assume that knowledge is a free gift.  Anyway, Scripture tells us that that knowledge is nothing the demons don't have - and shudder.

Q1A10: So I'm playing catch-up after a whirlwind week, and I trust you other chaps have already moved ahead of me to Q2. Nevertheless, with pith and perspective, I'll say simply that there is no greater exponent of St. Thomas' argument for analogy here than Scott Hahn's trilogy concerning the Word, the Eucharist and the Liturgy. That 'several senses' are built into the divine economy seems not only implicit but an absolutely necessary fact of His nature.

Q1A8:  Deductive logic seems to the "argument" at issue here.  Interestingly he makes a similar distinction in types of authority as we American lawyers do when we distinguish between a binding authority and a persuasive one.  Scripture is binding, but the words of Aristotle, Cicero, etc. function like, say an Alabama decision in an Oklahoma court.

Q1A9:  Well that's a relief.  As I think almost totally in metaphor and analogy, it is good to have that method of thought approved for the sacred science.  Nevertheless, the comments about withholding some truths from the unworthy is something to ponder.  At first that appears to have the odor of Gnosticism about it, but I come to St. Thomas with a hermeneutic of trust (not least because of the very scriptures he cites), so I will try to understand what he is saying here.

Q1A10:  This reminds me that I want to read De Lubac's Medieval Exigesis - but one massive theological undertaking at a time, n'est pas?  What most stands out to me in this article is St. Thomas' use of "literal".  His use is quite different from our colloquial use, let alone Sean Hannity's.

Vale,
JR

Q1A5:  I enjoyed this one the most so far.  What a question to ask!  Again, I see the influence of Greek philosophy here (please point out other sources if you see them) in assuming a hierarchy of sciences.  Sacred doctrine is held to be nobler than the other sciences.  That is no real surprise to me once you ask the question.  The key is to ask.  The Latin is instructive in this Article.  Nobler is from dignior.  Lower is from inferioris as higher comes from superiori.  

Q1A6:  So we are really talking about wisdom here, eh?  Excellent.  I may have mentioned this before, but one of the first things that appealed to me about the Christian religion was the wisdom literature (preceded only by my natural inclination to history - 1 and 2 Samuel as well as the Patriarchal narratives of Genesis fired my imagination).  Starting at about age 12 I loved the Book of Proverbs.  As a teenager and devotee of S. Kierkegaard, Ecclesiastes was especially enticing.  Then when I became Catholic as an adult, I was overjoyed to have new wisdom literature in Sirach and, well, Wisdom.  So Sacred Doctrine is wisdom.  I can accept that, but what about the wisdom I have obtained from Aristotle and Cicero?  Is that due to some Dantean proto-Christianity on the part of those great philosophers?

Q1A7:  God Himself is the object of this science.  We are studying Him above all.  When we study wisdom we are studying His wisdom.  When we study Man we are studying His children.    Fair enough.

Traveling tomorrow, but fully plan on finishing Q1.

Vale,
JR